Chapter 11

The Influence of Nativity (or Lack Thereof) on Arab-American Muslim Attitudes and Behaviors

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INTRODUCTION

The story of immigrants in the United States typically centers on the process of cultural assimilation. Ethnic minorities arriving on America's shores as foreigners will, the belief goes, eventually and collectively blend into the national landscape. The once precarious, now indelible status of Irish- and Italian-Americans is often pointed to as evidence of this phenomenon. While "No Irish Need Apply"[1] signs and affirmative action for individuals with Italian heritage (Scelsa 2011) now seem wholly anachronistic, the process that relegated these phenomena to a bygone era is thought to be ever-operable. Similarly subsumed within the vaunted American "melting pot" are religious minorities. There are indications that many members of these communities also follow an assimilative path, along the way diluting (if not altogether discarding) their distinctive beliefs and practices. Such is the case with American Jews, 62 percent of whom reported in 2013 that Jewish identity was mainly a matter of "Ancestry/Culture" rather than religion (Pew Research Center 2013).

As both an ethnic and religious minority, Arab-American Muslims (AAMs) are in a unique position to test the guardrails of cultural assimilation. While a majority of AAMs are foreign-born, there is a substantial (and growing) proportion that is native-born U. S. citizens. The attitudinal and behavioral differences between these first-generation immigrants and their successors are key indicators of the degree to which this minority population is following a so-called "straight line" assimilationist pathway or one that is more staggered/segmented (Portes and Zhou 1993). On the one hand, as Yvonne Haddad

(2007, 252) notes in her study of hijab adoption post-9/11: "The integration and assimilation of second and third generation Muslims into US society was expected to proceed according to a predictable trajectory noted among previous immigrant groups. The children of the immigrants would shed their parents' religious and cultural markings and become more Americanized." On the other hand, the general public's abiding suspicion of AAMs (particularly, though not exclusively, since the September 11th attacks) could affect this community's ability or even willingness to adopt certain markers of mainstream culture.

To help gauge the degree and mode of acculturation among this population, this chapter empirically examines the effect of nativity on AAM attitudes and behaviors. The study draws on pooled data from three waves of Pew's nationally representative surveys of American Muslims (2007, 2011, and 2017) and five waves of the American Muslim Poll (2016–2020) fielded by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. Analyses of these data demonstrate that (1) U.S.-born AAMs are no less religious than their immigrant counterparts, (2) nativity partially moderates social and political attitudes, and (3) AAMs experience and process discrimination in ways that highlight both the added conspicuousness of this minority group and the paradoxes of "cultural fluency" (Lajevardi et al. 2020). Where these findings ultimately place AAMs on the spectrum from isolation to assimilation is hard to say, especially given how nascent this community is relative to other recognized/potential "White ethnics" and the inexactness of terms such as "assimilation." Nonetheless, the results presented in this chapter provide a rare and wide-ranging empirical reference to help adjudicate claims of AAMs status in American society.

The next section briefly introduces the subject population before subsequently describing the data sources and the unique lens they offer into this largely overlooked minority group. The analysis then begins by highlighting demographic differences between foreign-born and U.S.-born AAMs, including key metrics of socio-economic status. With this foundation set, the study moves to the core examination of how nativity influences religiosity, social and political attitudes and behaviors, and experiences with discrimination. A concluding section puts these findings in a broader context and suggests fruitful avenues for research.

ARAB-AMERICAN MUSLIMS AND THE ASSIMILATION PARADOX

A Brief History of Arab-American Immigration and Identity Formation

Although America's relations with the Arab world stretch back to the country's founding,[2] large-scale immigration from the Middle East and North

Africa (MENA) to the United States did not take place until the late nineteenth century. From about 1870 through the 1910s, scores of predominantly Levantine Christian subjects of the failing Ottoman Empire came to America seeking economic opportunity and mobility (Foad 2013). The next influx took place over two decades beginning in the 1940s, but official quotas largely limited immigration during this period to individuals seeking asylum from war-torn countries and oppressive regimes—most of whom were Muslim, well-educated, and often members of influential families.[3] In 1965, however, the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) removed many nativist restrictions to immigration and paved the way for the bulk of Arab migration to America. As a result, the MENA immigrant population would increase four-fold between 1980 and 2010 (Batalova and Cumoletti 2018). Yet, even though the vast majority of Arab immigrants (particularly Muslim ones) entered the United States around the turn of the twentieth century, those initial immigrants from the Levant left a lasting impact on Arab-American identity.

For decades, the official Census taxonomy has categorized individuals of Middle Eastern descent as racially White. This designation was not haphazard but rather advocated for in courts and through public campaigns by immigrants early in the twentieth century—a time when "Whiteness" was a prerequisite for citizenship in America. In an early landmark decision, *Shishim v. United States* (1909), a Syrian Christian argued against his "Chinese-Mongolian" racial classification, stating: "If I am a Mongolian, then so was Jesus, because we came from the same land." The judge found this argument persuasive and the plaintiff became the first Arab naturalized as an American. Arab Muslims, however, were routinely denied citizenship (and "White" status) until 1944 (*Ex Parte* Mohriez). Eventually, in 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designated "persons originating in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa" as officially White, a classification which maintains to this day.

In recent years, however, a number of Arab-American civic organizations, activists, and celebrities have lobbied for the OMB to recognize Middle Easterners as a distinct ethnic group. Although this movement began in the 1980s, the 2000s and 2010s witnessed a more concerted and widespread effort on the part of advocates. In large part, this increased advocacy tracks the increased discrimination many Arab-Americans faced post-9/11 and the limited recourse to address these incidents in the absence of reliable population data needed for accurate reporting of these crimes. Notably, in the lead up to the 2010 Census, there was an organized effort on the part of multiple civil society organizations imploring persons of MENA descent to "Check it right; you ain't White!" (Kayyali 2013)—a call that was renewed once the decision came down that the OMB would jettison a proposed "Middle Eastern and North African" on the 2020 Census form.

The Complications of Assimilation

In the context of America's long-preserved racial hierarchy (whether *de jure* or *de facto*) and more recent targeted racialization and discrimination, AAMs find themselves stuck in something of an identity conundrum. Fundamentally, success for ethnic and racial minorities is to a large degree predicated on assimilation to White mainstream culture. This association is occasionally made explicit in official forums. For instance, in the landmark 1922 case *Takuji Yamashita v. Hinkle*, the attorney general for the state of Washington argued in a brief titled "The Japanese are Not Assimilable" that like "the Negro, . . . the Indian, and the Chinaman," the Japanese were unassimilable due to their immutable "marked physical characteristics." Yet, more often, socio-economic metrics are used to proxy an implicit adoption of the dominant culture. Viewed through this alternative lens, Asian-Americans are not only assimilable but are "achieving trajectories considered most proximate to the assimilation of European groups in the past" (Alba and Nee 2005, cited in Lee and Kye 2016, 254).

In terms of either the explicit or implicit renderings of assimilation, AAMs are in a seemingly advantageous (if not entirely unproblematic) position. Their aforementioned placement on the racial taxonomy forecloses questions into whether they have the requisite "assimilable" traits, yet it is worth once again emphasizing that religious affiliation played no small role in this assigned status. As Beydoun (2013) chronicles in his survey of Arab-American racial identity formation, early immigrants from the Levant leveraged Christianity as a "passage into Whiteness," allowing judges to consider Syrian Christians as racially distinct from Arabs (whom they still conflated with Muslims). In empirical terms, Ajrouch and Jamal (2007) find that Christians in the Detroit Arab American Study were significantly more likely to think of themselves as White compared to Muslim respondents.

Socio-economically, AAMs similarly appear to have the inside track on the path to assimilation. While there is sparse extant data on AAMs specifically, the first nationally representative survey of American Muslims was notably titled "Middle-Class and Mostly Mainstream" (Pew Research Center 2007). Along these same lines, a brief put out by the U.S. Department of Commerce following the 2010 decennial census reported that Arab-American household income was approximately 8.5 percent higher than the national average (Asi and Beaulieu 2013). Here, too, however, a cautionary note is in order as a closer examination of this census tally by country of origin reveals that the Arab-American households with the highest median income are also the ones that hail from areas with a significant Christian minority (i.e., Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine), and thus it is unclear what proportion of this broader community's income is attributable to AAMs.

These narratives of assimilation, however, contrast with the othering and discrimination that AAMs have endured since even before the attacks of September 11, 2001. With Said's (1979) masterwork as a foundation, scholars have tracked how orientalist tropes filter depictions of Middle Easterners, and Muslims more broadly, both in popular media (Alsultany 2012; Shaheen 2014) and news broadcasts (Lajevardi 2020). These (mis) representations facilitate not just the public's perception of Arabs as the "other" but also make salient to Arab-Americans their distinctiveness from the broader society. Discrimination toward persons thought to be Middle Eastern or Muslim, particularly since the 2016 election, further reinforces this dynamic. Moreover, this heightened discrimination, depending on the source, could lead to alienation and disengagement with the broader society (Oskooii 2015).

These competing accounts thus frame the following analysis. To be sure, given both geo-politics and the domestic socio-political environment since the turn of the century, it is hard to imagine that AAMs are on a pathway toward the same "ethnic White" status that Italians and the Irish now occupy. Yet, this assumption should not lead to the conclusion that AAMs wish to isolate themselves or otherwise settle into a permanent underclass. Put differently, the concept of assimilation could be too analytically limiting. To the extent that we observe differences between immigrant and native AAMs, they may be best considered through a broader lens of social and political adaptation that sets aside the normative connotations associated with a particular cultural pathway. The conclusion takes on these debates and discourses in more detail, but for now, let us turn to the analysis.

Data and Demographics

Undoubtedly, part of the reason that systematic research on AAMs has been lacking is the dearth of viable data sources. The Arab American Institute (AAI) estimates that those with MENA heritage ties constitute approximately 1 percent of the U. S. population. Myriad challenges face researchers seeking to survey such low-incidence populations (Berry, Chouhoud, and Junn 2018). It is no wonder, then, that (to my knowledge) the only publicly available survey data dedicated to this population comes from the 2003 Detroit Arab American Study. While the dataset from this project is an invaluable resource, its temporal and spatial bounds limit its utility. Additional proprietary data coming out of AAI and/or Zogby International buttress much of the descriptive knowledge we have on Arab-Americans, but does little to help us make inferences about this community.

While dedicated data on Arab-Americans remains sparse, surveys of American Muslims more generally have markedly increased since the mid-2000s. Yet,

Table 11.1 Demographic Differences

		Foreign Born (1)		*US Born (2)*		*T-Test Difference*
Variable	*Source*	*N*	*Mean (SE)*	*N*	*Mean (SE)*	*(1) – (2)*
Less than $30K	ISPU	340	0.35 (0.04)	242	0.26 (0.05)	0.09
$100K or more	ISPU	340	0.14 (0.02)	242	0.17 (0.03)	-0.03
College Graduate	ISPU	340	0.40 (0.04)	242	0.39 (0.05)	0.01
18 to 29	ISPU	340	0.37 (0.04)	242	0.57 (0.05)	-0.21***
55 or over	ISPU	340	0.13 (0.02)	242	0.03 (0.01)	0.10***
Married	ISPU	340	0.61 (0.04)	242	0.39 (0.05)	0.22***
Women	ISPU	339	0.36 (0.04)	242	0.49 (0.05)	-0.14**
Democrat/Lean D	ISPU	340	0.65 (0.04)	242	0.74 (0.05)	-0.09*
Republican/Lean R	ISPU	340	0.20 (0.03)	242	0.18 (0.04)	0.02
Somewhat/Very Liberal	ISPU	340	0.23 (0.03)	242	0.31 (0.04)	-0.08
Less than $30K	Pew	597	0.41 (0.03)	172	0.27 (0.06)	0.14**
$100K or more	Pew	597	0.09 (0.02)	172	0.05 (0.02)	0.04
College Graduate	Pew	597	0.28 (0.03)	172	0.26 (0.05)	0.03
18 to 29	Pew	597	0.32 (0.03)	172	0.72 (0.05)	-0.39***
55 or over	Pew	597	0.12 (0.02)	172	0.02 (0.01)	0.10***
Married	Pew	597	0.70 (0.03)	172	0.34 (0.06)	0.36***
Women	Pew	597	0.44 (0.03)	172	0.57 (0.06)	-0.13**
Democrat/Lean D	Pew	597	0.64 (0.03)	172	0.77 (0.06)	-0.13**
Republican/Lean R	Pew	597	0.07 (0.02)	172	0.12 (0.05)	-0.06
Somewhat/Very Liberal	Pew	597	0.23 (0.03)	172	0.25 (0.05)	-0.02

Source: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, American Muslim Poll (2016-2020); Pew Research Center (2007; 2011; 2017).
∗ *p<0.10,* ∗∗ *p<0.05,* ∗∗∗ *p<0.01.*

since the percentage of Muslims in America with MENA heritage ranges from 14 percent (Pew Research Center 2017) to 24 percent (Mogahed and Chouhoud 2017),[4] no one survey can provide any statistically valid insight into how intra-Arab opinion varies. To overcome this limitation, I pool the three waves of Pew's groundbreaking surveys of U.S. Muslims (2007, 2011, and 2017) along with five waves of the annual American Muslim Poll (2016–2020) commissioned by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU). This method yielded a sample size of 769 respondents from the Pew surveys and 585 from the ISPU polls. Pooling data from these two sources provides greater confidence when analyzing the metrics they share while also widening the breadth of analysis by incorporating those measures that only appear on one source. The full wording for all the non-demographic items discussed below (as well as any coding adjustments) can be found in the Appendix.

Table 11.1 provides a demographic comparison between foreign-born and U.S.-born respondents in the ISPU and Pew samples, respectively. While some estimates vary, the two survey sources evidence significant differences for nearly all the same traits and, just as important, all these differences point in the same direction. On the key socio-economic indicators of income and education, there appears to be little difference among AAMs on the basis of nativity. Age represents the largest statistical divide between U.S.-born and immigrant respondents, with clear majorities of the former falling into the 18–29 range while only a small fraction are over 55-years old. In terms of political leanings, it is important to note the higher proportion of U.S.-born Arabs self-identifying as Democrats may have more to do with immigrant aversion toward affiliating with political parties in general rather than any ideological divergence, as evident by the statistical parity when it comes to describing oneself as "Somewhat/Very Liberal." Taken together, these demographic disparities (not least on the basis of sex) indicate that any observed attitudinal or behavioral correlations with nativity could be an artifact of compositional differences. Therefore, in addition to Survey Year fixed effects, the analyses in the next section control for the suite of demographic variables in table 11.1.

NATIVITY AND THE ARAB-AMERICAN MUSLIM EXPERIENCE

Religiosity

The first set of analyses considers Arab-American Muslim religiosity. This factor features prominently in general assessments of assimilation, but takes on added analytical weight when considered in the context of this particular population. Its increased significance is rooted in the (sometimes implicit,



Figure 11.1 Multivariate Analyses: Predicted Probability of Being U.S. Born (90% CI).

often explicit) presumption that religiosity and societal disaffection tend to go hand-in-hand when it comes to Muslims in the West. An Oxford Analytica (2009, 1) brief distributed as incidents of domestic terrorism in America were beginning to multiply, typifies this association: "A sizeable portion of the immigrant Muslim-American population is becoming more religious and alienated from mainstream US society. This is true particularly among second-generation Muslims. This trend is similar to the growing religiosity among Muslims in many countries in Western Europe."

A landmark NYPD counter-terrorism study similarly casts suspicion on rising religious sentiment among American Muslims. In the radicalization process, the report outlines, for example, the second of four stages is described as "Self-Identification," in which an individual undergoes "religious seeking" by means of "trusted social networks made up of friends and family, religious leaders, literature and the Internet" (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 32). Moreover, while acknowledging that American Muslims have adapted (and have been allowed to adapt) far more than their European counterparts, the report nonetheless cautions that "[d]espite the economic opportunities in the United States, the powerful gravitational pull of individuals' religious roots and identity sometimes supersedes the assimilating nature of American society" (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 8).

In light of these dire warnings, it is particularly noteworthy that, as figure 11.1 demonstrates, there is no discernible difference between foreign-born and U.S.-born AAMs on any of the five unique measures of religiosity. This parity manifests with both subjective attitudes, such as the importance of religion in one's life, and objective behaviors, such as always wearing a *hijab*. Similarly, whether asking about private actions, like praying the five *salat*, or public ones, like attending weekly religious services or being active in the mosque, there is simply no drop-off in religiosity based on nativity. This finding is certainly at odds with the assimilative paths that other minority groups have taken in the past and, by extension, the one that American Muslims in particular were expected to be on. The preservation of religiosity past the first generation is all the more notable given that, in many instances, second-generation American Muslims often exhibit a commitment to religion that actually *exceeds* that of their immigrant parents (Chouhoud 2011).

Social and Political Attitudes and Behaviors

Does the stickiness of religiosity among AAMs translate to feelings of alienation and efforts to isolate? To examine whether this association—observed among European Muslims and presumed to be operable among American Muslims—holds, figure 11.1 also scrutinizes several relevant social and political attitudes and behaviors. These include preferences and actions that are tracked among the general public, as well as measures particular to Muslims in the United States.

Each of the general indicators tells a potentially rich story about the ways in which AAMs interact with society. First, there is no difference between immigrants and those born in the United States in terms of voter registration. Admittedly, this is a less-than-ideal item to have as the sole measure of political participation, given its susceptibility to social desirability bias, however, it is the only relevant question asked multiple times across either the set of Pew or ISPU survey years. A number of dynamics could be at play here. It may be that, since this question is only asked of those who can legally vote, naturalized immigrants wish to take advantage of the rights afforded to them, especially since many came from countries where voting was not particularly meaningful. Alternatively, perhaps the native-born in the sample either do not perceive voting to be the only or the best way to affect change. Given that Chouhoud, Dana, and Barreto (2019) found that Arabs were the most politically active in their study of American Muslim political participation (which included more comprehensive items), it is unlikely that this result reflects a generalized political apathy among U.S.-born AAMs.

There is also no difference on the basis of nativity when it comes to believing that society should accept homosexuality. This parity, however, masks a marked shift in sentiment over time. A secondary analysis of this item

revealed that the predicted probability of supporting the societal acceptance of homosexuality more than doubled over the span of a decade, on average, for both foreign-born and U.S.-born AAMs. This trend mirrors the one found among American Muslims generally as well as the broader public (Pew Research Center 2017, 27). This dramatic attitudinal swing also highlights that foreign-born AAMs can be just as adaptable to changing norms as their U.S.-born counterparts. Both natives and immigrants, after all, are clustered in the same macro environment and subject to the same societal stimuli. Given this context, we should not think that nativity is the only means by which individuals process society's ebbs and flows.

One preference that does exhibit a clear disparity on the basis of nativity is opposition to the use of military force in Afghanistan. A normatively neutral interpretation of this finding would be that native-born AAMs are simply more attuned to geo-politics, although that reading would presume that their immigrant counterparts are not consuming news from the MENA region, where geo-politics are perennially top-of-mind. A more promising reading, and perhaps one that is more likely, is that U.S.-born AAMs are more willing to voice their disapproval of American policies. Of course, the converse may also be true. That is, foreign-born AAMs could be self-censoring for fear of the consequences. Given that there is no compelling *a priori* justification to expect that immigrant respondents would be less critical of America's incursions into Muslim-majority countries, it is certainly possible that some measure of social desirability bias is driving this sub-group's responses to this question.

Turning to the Muslim-specific questions, they collectively evidence a socialization that does not run neatly along the more constrained pathway of straight-line assimilation. Native-born respondents are more likely to think of themselves as American first, but are just as likely as their foreign-born counterparts to think of themselves as Muslim first. Moreover, no group is more likely than the other to volunteer that they see themselves as equally American and Muslim. To be sure, what "Muslim first" means to respondents is not entirely clear and so this blunt ordering of identity may not be all that informative in itself. Indeed, as Naber (2005) argues, the prioritization of a Muslim identity may in part arise out of a desire to combat various racial and gender hierarchies in one's ethnic community. In this way, pronouncing a "Muslim first" identity may actually indicate an organic integration of religious conviction and American norms of multi-culturalism that eschew a deference to one particular cultural lens. Along these same lines, both native and immigrant AAMs are just as likely to report that most of their friends are Muslim, but those born in the United States are more likely to have a network where hardly any of their friends are Muslim. Taken together, this particular mix of parity and disparity suggests a process, discussed more in the conclusion, by which cultural adaptation coincides with (rather than supersedes) existing attitudes and behaviors.

Discrimination

A final set of indicators in figure 11.1 track experiences with discrimination. On each of the first three items in this grouping, which ask about particular circumstances, foreign-born AAMs are just as likely to report being discriminated against on the basis of their religion as those born in the United States. These findings diverge somewhat from recent research on American Muslims. More specifically, using this same Pew data, Lajevardi et al. (2020) find that native-born American Muslims are more likely to report having experienced suspicious looks and being called offensive names although being singled out at the airport was not related to immigrant status. Chouhoud (2018) finds an even starker pattern using ISPU data and speculates that native-born Muslims "are more attuned to the varied forms of discrimination that they may encounter on a day-to-day basis in America and thus can more easily code discriminatory behavior when they experience it." For AAMs, however, it seems that the discriminatory behavior they experience is overt enough that immigrants need not "read between the lines."

That is not to say, however, that nativity does not factor into the way that AAMs perceive discrimination. Indeed, in terms of overall frequency, U.S.-born respondents report experiencing religious discrimination either occasionally or regularly at a significantly higher rate. This could be where the ability to discern more subtle discriminatory interactions comes forth. That is, the higher rate of reported discrimination among U.S.-born AAMs could be a function of recognizing less explicit slights, such as micro-aggressions, or a sense that they are entitled to a certain level of treatment that their foreign-born counterparts may not be as cognizant of. Paradoxically, this heightened sensitivity to discrimination may actually be an indicator of "cultural fluency" that comes with integration (Lajevardi et al. 2020).

Moreover, the processing of discrimination appears to vary by immigrant status. The fact that U.S.-born respondents are significantly more likely to believe that America offers Muslims a better quality of life than most Muslim-majority countries speaks to the subjective toll that minority status exerts on immigrant Arab-Americans. It is worth emphasizing that this attitudinal divide is not a function of material well-being as education and income are held constant in the analysis. Rather, the gap indicates that native-born AAMs are better equipped with the social and cultural resources that allow them to filter their experience as a minority in the United States in a more productive manner—neither denying the experience nor letting it weigh them down. By that same token, as the final item in figure 11.1 demonstrates, AAMs born in the United States are much more likely to wholly reject anti-Muslim tropes rather than partially internalize them. In line with the prevalence of religiosity among this sub-population, the tendency to reject Islamophobic stereotypes is yet another indication that U.S.-born AAMs are

simply not inclined to abrogate their ethnic and religious background in favor of a more mainstream identity.

CONCLUSION

What emerges from the analyses in this chapter is a wide-ranging, empirically grounded depiction of how the sons and daughters of Arab immigrants to the United Stated have adapted to their minority status. The data demonstrates that the attitudes and behaviors of native-born AAMs both diverge from their foreign-born counterparts in notable, and occasionally predictable, ways, but also demonstrate parity when the expectations of assimilation theory would predict otherwise. Ultimately, whether and to what degree this community is assimilating is, in part, a function of the academic or pundit leveraging the term. Indeed, the slippage between assimilation, integration, acculturation, and socialization can constrain the utility of any of these terms. To the extent that any of these phenomena do apply to the Arab-American Muslim experience, they would likely require additional modifiers. One viable contender in this regard is "selective acculturation" as articulated by Portes and Rumbaut, meaning "the acquisition of English fluency and American cultural ways *along with* preservation of certain key elements of the immigrant culture" (2014, 350, emphasis in original).

This chapter is certainly far from the final word on Arab-American social and political adaptation. At minimum, the stark divide in age between native and immigrant AAMs, coupled with the similarly wide gulf in marriage rates, urges researchers to revisit the above findings once most Arabs born in the United States have gone through their prime earning years and started families of their own. Another fruitful avenue of research would be to dive deeper into the broad correlations discussed above. Empirically modeling the mechanisms that drive these surface-level observations would further refine our understanding of the ways in which AAMs navigate and negotiate minority status in America. What is clear at this point, however, is that AAMs are neither wholly alienated from the broader society nor do they seek to uncritically meld into the dominant culture. As with many discourses surrounding Muslims over the past two decades, this one, too, could use added nuance.

NOTES

1. While there remains a general consensus on the prevalence of anti-Irish discrimination in the latter half of the nineteenth century on through World War I, the incidence of "No Irish Need Apply" signs (or its variants) has recently been a topic of dispute (Lind 2015).

2. Morocco was the first country to officially recognize United States independence in December 1777.

3. These included Palestinians displaced by the founding of Israel, Egyptians whose property had been nationalized by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Iraqis fleeing their country after the 1958 revolution, elite Syrians excluded from government participation, and Eastern European Muslims escaping Communist rule (Haddad 1997).

4. The seemingly large gap in these estimates is most likely a result of Pew extrapolating MENA heritage based on respondents' country of origin (or that of their parents), whereas ISPU directly asks respondents for their race/ethnicity.

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Appendix 1
Question Wording

RELIGIOSITY

Variable	*Survey Source*	*Survey Year(s)*	*Question Wording*	*Response Options*
Attends religious services weekly	ISPU & Pew	Pew: ALL ISPU: ALL	Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?	More than once a week; once a week, once or twice a month; a few times a year; seldom; or never [rendered dichotomous for at least "once a week"]
Religion very important to R's life	ISPU & Pew	Pew: ALL ISPU: ALL	How important is religion in your life?	Very important; somewhat important; not too important; or not at all important [rendered dichotomous for "very important"]
Prays 5 daily salat	Pew	ALL	Concerning daily salah (sal-AH) or prayer, do you, in general, pray all five salah (sal-AH) daily, make some of the five salah (sal-AH) daily, occasionally make salah (sal-AH), only make Eid (EED) Prayers, or do you never pray?	[rendered dichotomous for "Pray all five salah"]

Variable	Survey Source	Survey Year(s)	Question Wording	Response Options
Always wears hijab	Pew	ALL	When you are out in public, how often do you wear the headcover or hijab (hee-jab)? Do you wear it all the time, most of the time, only some of the time, or never?	[rendered dichotomous for "All the time"]
Active in the mosque	Pew	2007, 2011	And outside of salah (sal-AH) and Jum'ah (joom-AH) prayer, do you take part in any other social or religious activities at the mosque or Islamic Center?	Yes; no

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Variable	Survey Source	Survey Year(s)	Question Wording	Response Options
Registered to vote	ISPU	ALL	Are you registered to vote at your present address or not?	Yes; no
Homosexuality should be accepted by society	Pew	ALL	Here are a few pairs of statements. For each pair, tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own views — even if neither is exactly right.	1 Homosexuality should be accepted by society [OR] 2 Homosexuality should be discouraged by society
Use of military force in Afghanistan was wrong decision	Pew	2007, 2011	Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan?	Right decision; Wrong decision

Variable	*Survey Source*	*Survey Year(s)*	*Question Wording*	*Response Options*
Thinks of self as "American First," "Muslim First," "American and Muslim, Equally"	Pew	2007, 2011	Do you think of yourself first as an American or first as a Muslim?	1 American 2 Muslim 3 Both equally (VOL.)
Most Friends / Hardly Any Friends are Muslim	Pew	ALL	How many of your close friends are Muslims?	1 All of them 2 Most of them 3 Some of them [OR] 4 Hardly any of them 5 (VOL. – DO NOT READ) None of them [rendered dichotomous for at least "most of them" or "hardly any of them," respectively]

DISCRIMINATION

Variable	*Survey Source*	*Survey Year(s)*	*Question Wording*	*Response Options*
People acted as if they are suspicious of you	Pew	ALL	have people acted as if they are suspicious of you	Yes; no
Been called offensive names	Pew	ALL	have you been called offensive names	Yes; no
Been singled out by airport security	Pew	ALL	have you been singled out by airport security	Yes; no
Experiences discrimination more than rarely	ISPU	ALL	How often, if at all, have you personally experienced discrimination in the past year because of your religion?	Never; rarely; occasionally; regularly

Variable	*Survey Source*	*Survey Year(s)*	*Question Wording*	*Response Options*
Better quality of life for Muslims in the U.S.	Pew	2007, 2011	What's your impression, do you think that the quality of life for Muslims in the U.S. is [RANDOMIZE: better, worse], or about the same as the quality of life in most Muslim countries?	[rendered dichotomous for "better"]
Holds some anti-Muslim bias	ISPU	2018, 2019, 2020	*	* [rendered dichotomous for greater than 0 on the Islamophobia Index.

* ISPU's Islamophobia Index scales five questions gauging anti-Muslim prejudice. The resulting measure ranges from 0 to 100. More details can be found at https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/AMP-2018-Key-Findings.pdf